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Abstract 
The Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) provides a reliable ERP marker of performance monitoring 
(PM). It is usually larger for negative compared to positive feedback, and for unexpected relative to 
expected feedback. In two experiments, we assessed whether these effects could be modulated by goal 
relevance, defined as feedback informativeness (reliability) and/or impact on a person’s goals. 64-
channels EEG was recorded while 30 participants (in each experiment) performed a speeded Go/NoGo 
task across blocks in which the feedback on task performance was deemed either relevant or not. At the 
ERP level, the FRN component was larger for (frequent) negative compared to (deviant) positive feedback 
exclusively when the feedback was relevant (Experiment 1). When the probability of positive and negative 
feedback was balanced (Experiment 2), this valence-driven FRN effect was absent. However, across these 
two experiments, the FRN was always larger for irrelevant than relevant feedback. Moreover, the 
subsequent P300 component was larger for feedback in the relevant than the irrelevant blocks. This effect 
was valence-unspecific in Experiment 1, while in Experiment 2 larger P3 amplitudes were recorded for 
negative than positive (relevant) feedback. Across the two experiments, a larger Correct-Related 
Negativity (CRN) in the irrelevant than relevant context was also observed, suggesting that PM is flexible. 
These ERP findings indicate that goal relevance influences feedback (and response) processing during 
PM, with two non-overlapping neurophysiological effects: It gates reward prediction error brain 
mechanisms (FRN effect), before enhancing subsequent motivational processes (P300 effect).  
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1. Introduction 
Performance monitoring (PM) is based on the processing of both internal and external cues or signals. 
When internal (i.e., motor-based) evidence is not available or has not accumulated properly, processing of 
external (feedback-related) incentives usually prevails and guides the course of PM. A large number of 
neurophysiological studies and models have already shown that the Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) 
reflects external feedback information processing during PM, and more specifically, reward prediction 
error (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Pakzad‐Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). 
When the feedback on task performance informs about a mismatch between the expected and/or desired 
outcome and the actual outcome (usually a response error or incorrect decision preceding feedback onset), 
a phasic and negative-going wave is elicited around 250-300 ms after its onset over fronto-central 
locations along the midline. Consistent with the reward prediction error account, the amplitude of the FRN 
is larger for monetary losses compared to wins (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002), for negative compared to 
positive symbolic performance feedback (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & 
Coles, 2004), and for unexpected relative to expected events (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons 2007; 
Pfabigan Alexopoulos, Bauer, Lamm, & Sailer, 2011; von Borries, Verkes, Bulten, Cools, & de Bruijn, 
2013). However, the exact functional meaning of the FRN component, and by extension, the cognitive 
process that it reflects, remains debated in the literature (Proudfit, 2015; Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & 
Endrass, 2014b). As outlined above, while some studies emphasized the role of the FRN in processing the 
(negative) valence of performance feedback irrespective of their likelihood (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & 
Simons, 2006), other studies have reported evidence for the opposite statement (i.e., the FRN is sensitive 
to expectedness, and more specifically, unexpected events, regardless of their valence; see Ferdinand, 
Mecklinger, Kray, & Gehring, 2012). In this study, we test the prediction that neither valence nor 
expectedness provides the critical dimension to explain FRN amplitude variations during PM, but rather 
‘goal relevance’ (see also Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2013). 
The concept of goal relevance plays a central role in research on emotions (Frijda, 1986), attention 
(Folk & Remington, 2008), and social cognition (Eitam & Higgins, 2010), but it has not always been 
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defined in a clear manner. Upon close examination of the literature, goal relevance seems to cover at least 
three dissociable meanings. (i) Goal relevance is sometimes used interchangeably with task relevance 
(e.g., Folk & Remington, 2008). A stimulus is goal-relevant if it allows implementation of a specific goal 
(e.g., if a task is to press a left button for red targets, red targets become goal-relevant in this sense). (ii) 
Alternatively, goal relevance may refer to the degree to which a stimulus is informative about the 
satisfaction status of pursued goals (see Moors, 2007). A stimulus is more or less informative when the 
information it conveys about the satisfaction status of goals is more or less certain or reliable. Therefore, 
goal relevance in this sense shares similarities with notions of certainty or precision, and with reliability 
and metacognitive confidence (Gibbons, Schnuerch, & Stahl, 2016; Pfabigan, Zeiler, Lamm, & Sailer, 
2014). (iii) Finally, goal relevance may correspond to the impact a stimulus has on the individual’s goals 
(Roseman & Smith, 2001). A stimulus is deemed more or less relevant if its impact on the goal is larger or 
smaller. For instance, winning 20 Euro has a larger impact on the goal to win money than winning only 2 
Euro
1
. Feedback on task performance can in some cases be relevant in the first sense (e.g., when the 
participant is asked to make responses dependent on the feedback), but in most standard cases, feedback is 
relevant in the second and/or the third sense. Feedback comes with a degree of informativeness, certainty 
or reliability, and it can impact goals to a large or small extent. 
These three meanings of goal relevance are partly but not entirely dissociable. A stimulus that is 
goal-relevant in the first sense (allowing implementation of a goal) signals potential goal satisfaction, and 
in this way, it is also relevant in the second (reliability) and the third sense (impact). However, stimuli can 
be relevant in the second and/or third sense without being relevant in the first sense. For instance, the 
presentation of a reward has an impact on one’s goal to win money (cf. third sense) but may not allow 
implementing a further goal (cf. first sense). Goal relevance in the second and third sense are not entirely 
                                                          
1
 Impact has partial but not complete overlap with the economical definition of value (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Sambrook & Goslin, 2015; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). Value can be considered as a combination of impact and 
valence: A gain of 20 Euro has more value than a gain of 2 Euro, which has more value than a loss of 2 Euro, which 
in turn has more value than a loss of 20 Euro. A loss of 20 Euro has the same impact as a gain of 20 Euro, and a loss 
of 2 Euro has the same impact as a gain of 2 Euro. Losses and gains of 20 Euro have a higher impact than losses and 
gains of 2 Euro.  
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independent either. It seems reasonable to assume that feedback has to have a minimal degree of reliability 
before it can impact on a person’s goals, and that increasing the reliability of the feedback increases its 
sweak to very strong. 
In the present study, we sought to test the assumption that a feedback’s goal relevance in the 
second sense (reliability) can account for amplitude variations at the level of the FRN component during 
PM, besides or beyond what valence alone or expectedness alone can explain. To this end, we used a 
specific experimental setting in which the informativeness or reliability of feedback stimuli was varied 
independently from their valence and their degree of expectedness
2
. In addition, we made sure to keep the 
task relevance (goal relevance in the first sense) of the feedback stimuli constant. Given the above-
mentioned potential influence of goal relevance in the second sense (informativeness) on goal relevance in 
the third sense (impact), we could not isolate the former from the latter. Thus, the present study sought to 
investigate the role of goal relevance in the second (and/or third) sense on the FRN component. From now 
on, we use the term ‘goal relevance’ in the second sense unless specified otherwise. We manipulated the 
goal relevance of feedback systematically across blocks using a stringent within-subjects experimental 
design (see also Gibbons et al., 2016; Pfabigan et al., 2014). 
Participants performed a standard speeded Go/NoGo task, as used previously and validated by 
Aarts and Pourtois (2010; 2012), Koban, Pourtois, Bediou, and Vuilleumier (2012), and Vocat, Pourtois, 
and Vuilleumier (2008). The goal of this task is to respond both accurately and timely (before an arbitrary 
reaction time speed cut-off unknown to the participants). On each and every trial, feedback regarding 
performance is provided to the participant. Because reaction time (RT) is inherently more variable/labile 
and harder to decipher than accuracy for participants, they have to carefully monitor the feedback in order 
                                                          
2
 Whether a stimulus is positive or negative is independent of whether it provides an opportunity for goal 
implementation (goal relevance in the first sense) and whether or not it is informative about goal satisfaction (goal 
relevance in the second sense). Also, positive and negative stimuli may both have an impact on goal satisfaction 
(goal relevance in the third sense), although the phenomenon of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) suggests 
that losses have a larger impact on goals than equal wins. Whether a stimulus is expected or unexpected is 
independent of goal relevance in all three senses: expected and unexpected stimuli provide equal opportunity for the 
implementation of goals, they can be equally informative about the satisfaction status of goals, and their impact on 
goal satisfaction may be equally high. 
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to assess whether their actions are goal-conducive (i.e., correct and fast enough) or not (i.e., either 
incorrect or too slow). Crucially, across blocks, participants were told that this feedback was either 
relevant (reflecting their behavior and therefore informative about the satisfaction status of their goals) or 
irrelevant. Goal relevance in the first sense was kept constant by making the feedback equally task-
relevant in both contexts: Participants had to discriminate the emotional content of the feedback now and 
then, equally often in both contexts. Hence, even when the feedback was irrelevant, participants still had 
to attend to it in order to carry out the additional emotion discrimination task. 
We predicted a significant interaction effect between feedback valence (positive vs. negative) and 
context (relevant vs. irrelevant) at the FRN level, consistent with the goal relevance account. More 
specifically, we reckoned that the FRN should capture the difference between positive and negative 
feedback in the relevant context only, while no such valence effect should be observed in the irrelevant 
context. In the irrelevant context, the rapid and seemingly automatic processing of feedback valence (and 
expectedness) at the FRN level should be transiently interrupted (see Moors, 2007; Ullsperger et al., 
2014b). Obviously, this does not imply that PM does not operate in the irrelevant context. PM can flexibly 
sreliable external cues in the irrelevant context may therefore lead to a shift from external to internal 
monitoring. In other words, we hypothesized an enhanced internal monitoring in the irrelevant compared 
to the relevant context, which would be expressed by a larger Correct-Related Negativity (CRN) 
differentiation between slow and fast hits in this condition specifically.  
Experiment 1 used a procedure in which reward probability was low in the relevant context. That 
is, participants were more likely to receive negative than positive feedback given the specifics of the 
speeded Go/NoGo task used (see Aarts & Pourtois, 2012). No such asymmetry was implemented in the 
irrelevant context, however, where feedback valence was unrelated to task performance, and hence 
positive and negative feedback were shown equally often in a random order. Obviously, this difference 
created a potential confound in terms of objective reward probability, and therefore most likely also in 
terms of subjective reward expectation, also called reward expectancy (see Ferdinand et al., 2012; von 
Borries et al., 2013). In the current study, we used the term ‘expectancy’ to refer to the manipulation of 
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feedback probability. Thus, in Experiment 1 the two main contexts differed not only regarding goal 
relevance per se, but also regarding reward expectancy (which was lower in the relevant than the 
irrelevant context), a factor which is known to influence the magnitude of the FRN as well (Ferdinand et 
al., 2012; Holroyd et al., 2008). In order to overcome this limitation, we ran Experiment 2, in which we 
used the same task in a new sample of participants, but we set up the experimental procedure (i.e., the 
response deadline) in such a way that the number of positive vs. negative feedback stimuli was matched 
between the relevant and irrelevant context. As a result, only goal relevance (but not reward expectancy) 
varied systematically between both contexts. In sum, goal relevance was manipulated in each of the two 
experiments, but its relation with reward expectancy differed across them.  
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
In Experiment 1, thirty five healthy adult subjects participated in exchange of 30 Euro compensation. Five 
subjects had to be excluded from the subsequent analyses: one based on a strict age criterion (i.e., this 
participant’s age was 3 SDs above the mean age of the sample), two due to a failure in the experimental 
procedure, and two due to the excessive noise and artifacts during the EEG recording. Hence, the final 
sample consisted of 30 subjects (6 men; mean age: 21.9; SD = 2.7). All subjects were right-handed and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were free of neurological or psychiatric history and of any 
psychoactive medication. Prior to the experiment they gave written informed consent. 
In Experiment 2, forty subjects participated in exchange of 30 Euro compensation. Ten subjects 
had to be excluded from the subsequent analyses: three due to the excessive noise and artifacts during the 
EEG recording, and seven due to an insufficient number (3 SDs below the sample mean) of fast hits 
necessary for further analyses. Hence, the final sample consisted of 30 subjects (8 men; mean age: 22.1; 
SD = 2.3). 
As anxiety and perceived locus of control can each influence PM at the FRN level (see Aarts & 
Pourtois, 2012), we administrated the STAI-trait version (Dutch version; Defares, van der Ploeg, & 
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Spielberger, 1979), and the Locus of Control (LOC) questionnaire (Dutch version; Rotter, 1966) in both 
experiments. For participants from Experiment 1, the mean STAI score was 39.2 (range: 25-62) and the 
LOC score 13 (range: 5-18). In Experiment 2, the mean trait anxiety level was 37.3 (range: 23-68) and the 
mean LOC score 11.7 (range: 3-19). Independent samples t-tests confirmed that there were no significant 
differences in the level of trait anxiety (t(58) = 0.73, p = 0.472) and locus of control (t(58) = 1.31, p = 0.198) 
between the two experiments. 
2.2. Experimental paradigm and procedure 
A modified version of a speeded Go/NoGo task was used in both experiments (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; 
2012; Koban et al., 2012; Pourtois, 2011; Vocat et al., 2008). The experimental design is presented in 
Figure 1. 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
All visual stimuli were shown on a 21-inch CRT screen. Each trial started with a black fixation 
cross lasting for 1000 ms. Then, a black arrow (‘cue’), either oriented up or down, was presented. After a 
variable interval ranging from 1000 ms up to 2000 ms, the black arrow became either green or turquoise, 
while its orientation could either remain identical or shift in the opposite (in-plane) orientation. When the 
black arrow turned green and the orientation remained unchanged (‘target’), participants were instructed 
to press a predefined key on the response box as fast as possible with the index finger of their right hand 
(‘Go trials’). However, participants had to withhold responding when either the arrow became green but 
flipped orientation, or when the arrow became turquoise and kept its initial orientation (‘non-targets’ in 
‘NoGo trials’). In the absence of motor responses, targets and non-targets remained on the screen for 1000 
ms. Cues, targets, and non-targets consisted of an arrow (11.4˚ × 0.05˚ of visual angle at a 50 cm viewing 
distance), presented in the center of the screen on a white background. After motor responses (correct: 
‘hits’; incorrect: ‘false alarms’), a colored frame was presented for 1000 ms around the target. Following 
that, a response-feedback interval was presented for 1000 ms. This event consisted of the presentation of 
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the colored frame only, and it served to indicate whether the feedback provided was relevant or not (see 
below). The colored frame remained on the screen around the feedback for 1000 ms (see also Figure 1). 
Participants were given positive feedback when they responded both correctly and fast to Go trials 
(‘fast hit’), and when they correctly withheld responding to NoGo trials (‘correct inhibition’). They were 
given negative feedback when the response was correct but too slow (‘slow hit’), when they gave a 
response to NoGo trials (‘false alarm’), or when there was no response to Go trials (‘omission’). We used 
an online adaptive algorithm to set up a limit for correct and fast RTs (i.e., response deadline procedure) in 
Go trials. At the beginning of the experiment, the RT limit was set to 300 ms (based on previous pilot 
testing; Vocat et al., 2008). This limit was adjusted online (i.e., after each trial) as a function of the 
immediately preceding trial history, more specifically, as the mean of current and previous RTs. 
Responses that were slower than the limit were classified as slow hits; responses that were faster than the 
limit were classified as fast hits. The advantage of this algorithm is that uncertainty about current RTs is 
high throughout the task (given the fluctuations of RTs), which motivates participants to actively attend to 
the external feedback stimulus presented after each response to infer whether their actions (during Go 
trials) were timely (fast hits) or not (slow hits). Moreover, the response deadline is updated throughout the 
experiment in order to avoid habituation or fatigue, and it is set up in such a way that correct and fast 
responding to Go trials is fairly difficult to achieve (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; 2012; Dhar & Pourtois, 2011; 
Dhar, Pourtois, & Wiersma, 2011; Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 2010; Koban et al., 2012; 
Vocat et al., 2008). This ensures that participants show a high involvement in the task (Atkinson & 
Feather, 1966). Feedback following actions on NoGo trials (positive feedback following a correct 
inhibition or negative feedback following a false alarm) was not informative as participants could readily 
evaluate the accuracy of their actions on these trials using internal monitoring (see Koban et al., 2012 for a 
clear demonstration using a similar task). Therefore, in this study, we focused on the ERP responses to 
evaluative and highly informative feedback following fast or slow hits to Go trials only. 
As the main goal of our study was to assess the role of feedback relevance (reliability) for eliciting 
a clear reward prediction error signal during PM, we created two contexts (relevant vs. irrelevant) varying 
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with respect to the relationship between the response and the given feedback, while the task and the 
stimuli remained identical in both contexts. This manipulation was always clearly indicated to participants 
by the use of: (i) written instructions delivered before the start of each block, (ii) a colored frame (either 
blue or magenta) appearing immediately around targets or non-targets after the manual (key press) 
response and remaining on the screen until feedback offset throughout the whole block (see above and 
Figure 1). In the relevant condition, the feedback was reliable in the sense of being always related to the 
actual speed and the accuracy of the response. Therefore, participants always received positive feedback 
after fast hits and correct inhibitions, while they received negative feedback in case of slow hits, false 
alarms, and omissions. In contrast, in the irrelevant condition, the feedback provided after the response 
was not related to the actual performance. Positive and negative feedback were delivered randomly (drawn 
from a pre-existing list), with an equal probability of these two valences, irrespective of the accuracy and 
speed of the preceding action.  
Feedback stimuli consisted of emotional or neutral faces. The feedback was always uninformative 
in the irrelevant condition and always informative in the relevant condition. Thus, participants were less 
encouraged to pay attention to the feedback in the irrelevant than the relevant condition. To avoid unequal 
attention allocation to the feedback stimulus in both conditions, we included ‘catch trials’: In 17% of the 
trials and in random order, participants were additionally asked (second task) to categorize the valence of 
the face presented as feedback. At the offset of the feedback, a question probed their ability to categorize 
the face as carrying a positive vs. negative expression. For this purpose, they were instructed to press 
predefined keys on the response box with the index finger of their right hand. No time limit was imposed 
and accuracy was emphasized.  
The experiment consisted of a training session with 32 trials (always with a relevant feedback), 
followed by 6 experimental blocks, each including 56 trials (40 Go and 16 NoGo trials in each block). 
Go/NoGo trial presentation was randomized within blocks. There were 3 blocks per condition (relevant 
vs. irrelevant). Hence, feedback relevance served as a within-subjects factor in subsequent statistical 
analyses. Two specific orders were created: R-I-R-I-R-I or I-R-I-R-I-R, with ‘R’ referring to relevant 
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context, and ‘I’ to irrelevant context. Moreover, the mapping of frame color (blue vs. magenta) on context 
(relevant vs. irrelevant) was counterbalanced across participants. Hence, in total, four different versions of 
the experimental procedure were created, and participants were randomly assigned to one of them at the 
beginning of the experiment. 
After each block, feedback relevance was evaluated by means of a Visual Analog Scale (VAS). 
More specifically, participants were asked to rate how relevant (for gauging task performance) feedback 
was during the previous block on a continuous scale ranging from -50 (not at all) to +50 (very much). 
These subjective ratings served as a direct manipulation check of feedback relevance. 
In Experiment 1 the online adjustment and calibration of the RT speed limit used to categorize Go 
trials into fast vs. slow hits was similar to previous studies (see Aarts & Pourtois, 2012). In Experiment 2, 
task demands and trial structure were identical to Experiment 1, but we modified the procedure with the 
aim of achieving an equal amount of positive and negative feedback in the relevant context (for a majority 
of participants, and despite the inter-individual variability in their RTs). Therefore, we adjusted the RT 
deadline across blocks using specific (predefined) time limits. After extensive piloting, we found out that 
pre-setting the time limit to 300 (Blocks 1-2), 275 (Blocks 3-4), and 250 ms (Blocks 5-6) yielded the 
expected effect (i.e., a balanced number of fast hits followed by positive feedback, and slow hits followed 
by negative feedback) in the majority of subjects. With these parameters, we also dealt with unspecific 
learning/habituation effects. Participants were never informed about this procedure. Stimulus presentation 
and response recording were controlled using E-prime software (V2.0., http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-
prime/).  
2.3. Face stimuli 
In both experiments the same set of 24 different face identities (12 per gender) with a neutral, happy or 
angry emotional expression were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database 
(KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). In one group (n=15), 12 happy and 12 neutral faces were 
used in the relevant condition, and another 12 happy and 12 neutral expressions in the irrelevant context. 
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In this group, the happy faces served as the positive feedback stimuli and the neutral faces as the negative 
feedback stimuli. In the other group (n=15), 12 angry and 12 neutral faces were used as feedback stimuli 
in the relevant condition, and another 12 angry and 12 neutral expressions in the irrelevant feedback 
condition. In this group, the neutral faces served as positive feedback stimuli and the angry faces as 
negative feedback stimuli. For each participant, the actual faces used as positive or negative feedback 
were selected randomly from the set of 24 faces. We made sure that each face was presented equally often 
in the relevant and the irrelevant condition. For each participant and condition separately, 8 faces (4 per 
gender and 4 per emotional content) were preselected and used for the catch trials (see above).  
After the experimental session, all the faces used during the experiment (n=48) were presented 
again one by one (without time limit) with their corresponding colored frame. Participants were asked to 
rate the valence of each face on a scale ranging from -50 (very negative) to + 50 (very positive). 
There were several reasons for using emotional faces as feedback stimuli instead of binary 
symbolic stimuli (e.g., the written words: correct and incorrect, or green and red dots). First, the use of 
faces as feedback was previously validated (the procedure used in the relevant condition was identical to 
the one used previously by Aarts & Pourtois, 2012). Second, the use of faces allowed us to make the 
content of the feedback stimuli unpredictable (we used 24 different face identities, presented in a random 
order, which resulted in low statistical regularity), in order to encourage their thorough exploration by the 
participant each time. This would not be possible with binary symbolic stimuli. Further, to make sure that 
a thorough processing of the positive vs. negative content of the stimuli took place in both contexts 
(relevant and irrelevant), we added catch trials in which participants had to respond on the basis of this 
content. This would be more difficult to achieve with simple symbolic stimuli. Finally, emotional faces 
provide potent social stimuli that may have a stronger impact than symbolic stimuli (although this 
argument awaits further empirical validation). 
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2.4. EEG acquisition and processing 
In both experiments, participants were seated in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated, and electrically shielded 
cabin. Continuous EEG was acquired at 512 Hz using a 64-channel (pin-type) Biosemi Active Two 
system (http://www.biosemi.com), referenced online to the Common ModeSense (CMS)-Driven Right 
Leg (DRL) ground. All electrodes were placed according to the extended International 10-20 EEG system 
using an elastic head cap. The horizontal and vertical EOG were monitored by means of 4 electrodes, 
placed above and below the right eye and on the outer canthi of both eyes. 
2.4.1. ERP analyses 
ERPs of interest were computed offline following a standard sequence of data transformations (Keil, 
Debener, Gratton, Junghöfer, Kappenman, Luck, Luu, Miller, & Yee, 2014): (i) 50-Hz notch filter; (ii) 
rereferencing of the EEG signal using a common average reference; (iii) -500/+1000 ms segmentation 
around the onset of the feedback stimulus, or -500/+500 ms segmentation around the response onset; (iv) 
pre-stimulus interval baseline correction (from -500 ms to feedback onset), or pre-response interval 
baseline correction (from -500 to -300 ms prior to the motor response); (v) vertical ocular correction for 
blinks (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983); (vi) semi-automatic artifact rejection (trials with motor artifacts 
were rejected, with a fixed criterion of ±80 μV); (vii) averaging of the feedback-locked ERPs for each 
type of feedback separately (i.e., positive feedback following fast hits and negative feedback following 
slow hits in the relevant condition, positive and negative feedback following hits in the irrelevant 
condition), or averaging of the response-locked ERPs for each type of response separately (fast hits and 
slow hits recorded in the relevant and irrelevant conditions); and (viii) low pass digital filtering of the 
individual average data (30 Hz). 
We focused on the Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) and the P3a and P3b components, which 
all have been related to feedback processing in previous ERP studies focused on PM (Aarts & Pourtois, 
2012; Bismark, Hajcak, Whitworth, & Allen, 2013; Ferdinand et al., 2012; Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013; 
Pfabigan et al., 2011; 2014; von Borries et al., 2013; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). The FRN was defined as 
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the mean voltage within 250-300 ms after feedback onset over frontal and fronto-central electrodes along 
the midline (Fz and FCz pooled together). P3a was defined as the mean voltage appearing 350-450 ms 
after feedback onset at the same locations as the FRN. The P3b amplitude was measured as a mean 
voltage between 400 and 600 ms after feedback onset at a cluster of centro-parietal electrodes (CPz, Pz, 
P1, and P2 pooled together). Additionally, the CRN (in response to either fast or slow hits) was defined as 
the mean voltage recorded 10 ms prior to until 30 ms after motor response at fronto-central electrodes 
along the midline (Fz and FCz pooled together).  
2.4.2. Spatio-temporal separation of FRN and P3a 
To further validate the presence of two successive and distinctive neural events during feedback 
processing (i.e., FRN and P3a) and given their partial spatial overlap when titrated using a standard peak 
analysis (see Holroyd et al., 2008), we performed an auxiliary ERP topographical mapping analysis, using 
the Cartool program (http://brainmapping.unige.ch/cartool). While the previous analysis focused on 
amplitude variations occurring at electrodes Fz and FCz for the FRN and P3a as a function of feedback 
valence and relevance, we wanted to establish more formally that these two successive feedback-locked 
ERP components could indeed be dissociated from one another based on their topographical properties 
(and hence when considering the entire electric field composed of 64 channels concurrently; for a similar 
approach see Pourtois, De Pretto, Hauert, & Vuilleumier, 2006).  
Following a standard procedure (see Pourtois, Delplanque, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2008; Murray, 
Brunet, & Michel, 2008), the grand average ERP waveforms were submitted to a K-means clustering 
algorithm that enabled isolating the underlying dominant topographical maps. This algorithm clearly 
revealed the presence of two dissociable topographical components during the 200-500 ms post-feedback 
onset interval, one corresponding to the FRN (see Figure 2B) and the other one to the P3a (see Figure 2C). 
The spatial correlation between these two ERP topographical maps was .63 and .84 for Experiment 1 and 
2, respectively.  
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2.5. Statistical analyses 
For each experiment separately, we used mixed model ANOVAs to analyze the behavioral and 
electrophysiological data. These ANOVAs included the within-subjects factors VALENCE (positive vs. 
negative) and CONTEXT (relevant vs. irrelevant) for feedback-related ERPs, while for response-related 
ERPs, RESPONSE (fast hit vs. slow hit) and CONTEXT were used as within-subjects variables. 
Significant main or interaction effects were reported first, followed by post hoc paired t-tests when 
applicable.  
For the feedback-related electrophysiological data, we analyzed the differential (and global) 
processing of positive vs. negative feedback at the ERP level (as a function of the perceived feedback 
relevance) irrespective of the actual facial expressions used to convey these two feedbacks. To this aim, 
the neutral faces used as negative feedback in one group of participants were pooled together with the 
angry faces also used as negative feedback in the other group of participants. Similarly, neutral faces used 
as positive feedback in this latter group were combined with happy faces used as positive feedback in the 
former group. This way, the observed ERP effects were devoid of pre-existing physical or emotional 
differences between the two categories (positive vs. negative feedback).  
3. Results  
3.1. Behavioral results 
Accuracy for catch trials was high and comparable in both contexts and experiments (see Table 1). In 
Experiment 1 participants’ actual performance was balanced between the relevant and irrelevant context 
(all ps > 0.65, see Table 1), suggesting a comparable task engagement in these two conditions. As 
expected, participants had a larger number of slow hits (approximately 2/3) than fast hits (1/3), both in the 
relevant (t(29) = -7.26, p < 0.001) and the irrelevant context (t(29) = -8.44, p < 0.001). Despite this 
asymmetry at the response level, the number of positive vs. negative feedback stimuli delivered in the 
irrelevant context was not statistically different (t(29) = 0.22, p = 0.828), confirming that feedback valence 
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and response (speed) were properly decoupled in this context, unlike the relevant context, where the 
number of negative and positive feedback stimuli differed significantly (t(29) = -7.26, p < 0.001; see Table 
1). RTs were overall longer in the irrelevant compared to the relevant context, however, irrespective of the 
actual action being performed (fast hits, t(29) = -5.32, p < 0.001; slow hits, t(29) = -3.14, p = 0.004; false 
alarms, t(29) = -3.31, p = 0.003), suggesting a global change (i.e., slowing down effect with irrelevant 
feedback) in PM processes created by the context manipulation, as opposed to specific alterations (e.g., 
systematic change of the speed-accuracy tradeoff). 
In Experiment 2, participants’ performance was similarly balanced between the two contexts (all 
ps > 0.55, see Table 1). Importantly, because of the change in the experimental procedure made in this 
experiment (see above), the number of positive and negative feedback stimuli delivered in each context 
was similar (CONTEXT x VALENCE interaction: F(1,29) = 0.72, p = 0.401, ηp
2
 = 0.012). Hence, there was 
no asymmetry between positive and negative feedback, neither in the relevant (t(29) = -0.89, p = 0.379) nor 
in the irrelevant context (t(29) = -0.33, p = 0.974). Similarly to Experiment 1, longer RTs were observed in 
the irrelevant compared to the relevant context in this experiment, irrespective of the actual type of 
response given (for fast hits, t(29) = -5.76, p < 0.001; for slow hits, t(29) = -4.73, p < 0.001; and for false 
alarms, t(29) = -2.41, p = 0.023).  
[insert Table 1 here] 
3.2. Evaluation of feedback relevance  
In Experiment 1, the data of one subject were lost, and they were replaced by the corresponding condition-
specific mean values calculated for the whole sample. Importantly, feedback provided in the relevant 
context (M = 11.31, SEM = 4.38) was evaluated as more reliable when compared with the irrelevant 
condition (M = -12.38, SEM = 3.13) (F(1,29) = 18.63, p < 0.001, ηp
2
 = 0.391) confirming that the 
manipulation of goal relevance across successive blocks was successful.  
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In Experiment 2 feedback provided in the relevant context (M = 30.81, SEM = 2.61) was also 
evaluated as more reliable compared to feedback given in the irrelevant one (M = -18.91, SEM = 2.97), as 
confirmed by a highly significant main effect of CONTEXT (F(1,29) = 118.92, p < 0.001, ηp
2
 = 0.804).  
A direct comparison of these ratings between the two experiments showed a significant 
EXPERIMENT x CONTEXT interaction (F(2,58) = 13.31, p = 0.001, ηp
2
 = 0.187), indicating that 
participants judged the feedback to be more reliable in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. Follow-up t-
tests showed that for the relevant context only (t(58) = -3.82, p < 0.001) feedback was judged as more 
reliable in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1. No such difference was observed in the irrelevant 
context (t(58) = 1.51, p = 0.136). 
 
3.3. Ratings of the perceived valence of faces 
In Experiment 1, the data of one subject were lost and replaced by the mean values calculated for the 
whole sample for these specific conditions. As expected, faces used as positive feedback stimuli were 
rated as more positive (M = 20.61, SEM = 1.75) than faces used as negative feedback stimuli (M = -25.37, 
SEM = 1.51) (t(59) = 24.91, p < 0.001). This valence effect was balanced across the two contexts (t(29) = 
1.67, p = 0.105 for positive and t(29) = 0.75, p = 0.459 for negative feedback). 
Face rating data of Experiment 2 were similar to those of Experiment 1. Faces used as positive 
feedback stimuli were rated as more positive (M = 18.47, SEM = 1.94) than faces used as negative 
feedback stimuli (M = -24.48, SEM = 1.87) (t(59) = 28.68, p < 0.001). This effect was the same for both 
contexts (t(29) = 1.89, p = 0.168 for positive and t(29) = -0.99, p = 0.327 for negative feedback). 
3.4. Electrophysiological results 
3.4.1. FRN component 
In Experiment 1, for amplitude values recorded from Fz and FCz electrodes pooled together 250-300 ms 
post-face stimulus onset, the main effect of CONTEXT was significant (F(1,29) = 6.89, p = 0.014, ηp
2 
= 
0.192), while the main effect of VALENCE was not (F(1,29) = 1.09, p = 0.304, ηp
2 
= 0.036). Importantly, a 
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significant CONTEXT x VALENCE interaction was found (F(1,29) = 5.49, p = 0.026, ηp
2
 = 0.159). More 
negative amplitude values were recorded for negative (M = -1.35 μV, SD = 2.71) compared to positive 
feedback (M = 0.22 μV, SD = 2.73). However, this valence effect was found in the relevant context only 
(t(29) = 2.08, p = 0.047). No such effect was visible when the feedback was deemed irrelevant (t(29) = -0.98, 
p = 0.331), with M = -1.35 μV (SD = 2.75) and M = -1.37 μV (SD = 2.73) in response to negative and 
positive feedback, respectively. 
 
In Experiment 2, the main effect of CONTEXT was significant (F(1,29) = 4.57, p = 0.041, ηp
2 
= 
0.136), showing that feedback (regardless of its valence) elicited a larger negative component in the 
irrelevant compared to the relevant context (very much like the FRN recorded in Experiment 1), 
suggesting a differential (valence-unspecific) processing of the feedback in these two contexts. Moreover,  
neither the main effect of VALENCE (F(1,29) = 1.35, p = 0.255, ηp
2 
= 0.044), nor the CONTEXT x 
VALENCE interaction (F(1,29) = 1.81, p = 0.189, ηp
2 
= 0.059) reached significance, and only a trend 
towards more negative amplitudes was found (t(29) = 1.64, p = 0.112) for negative (M = -2.44 μV, SD = 
2.39) compared to positive feedback (M = -1.89 μV, SD = 2.31) in the relevant context. No such trend 
(t(29) = 0.02, p = 0.988) was visible in the irrelevant context (M = -2.63 μV, SD = 1.94, and M = -2.63 μV, 
SD = 2.41 for negative and positive feedback, respectively)
3
.  
[insert Figures 2 and 3 here] 
3.4.2. P3a component 
In Experiment 1, the early valence effect (in the relevant context) extended beyond the time-course of the 
FRN (250-300 ms), and yielded a conspicuous P3a component (350-450 ms), likely caused by the 
                                                          
3
 Visual inspection of the waveforms presented in Figures 2 and 3 suggested that a frontal P2 component occurred 
prior to the FRN component. This positive component is the frontal counterpart of the occipito-temporal face-
specific N170 component, usually known in the ERP literature as the VPP (Vertex Positive Potential; see Jeffreys & 
Tukmachi, 1992; Jeffreys, 1993). To exclude the possibility of any earlier context- or valence-specific effect at this 
level (P2), an auxiliary analysis was run. To analyze the VPP, we extracted the mean amplitude of the ERP signal 
during the 160-200 ms post-stimulus onset interval at electrodes Fz and FCz (collapsed together). The 2 x 2 ANOVA 
(with CONTEXT and VALENCE as within-subjects factors) did not reveal any significant main or interaction 
effects (at a standard p < .05 value) however, for none of the two experiments, confirming that PM processes (at the 
feedback level) were not affected by these factors prior to onset of the FRN component. 
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infrequent presentation of positive feedback in this context. No such orienting response was found in the 
irrelevant context where the amount of positive and negative feedback was balanced (see Figure 2). These 
observations were verified by significant main effects of CONTEXT (F(1,29) = 19.21, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 
0.398) and VALENCE (F(1,29) = 10.05, p = 0.004, ηp
2 
= 0.257), and a significant interaction effect between 
CONTEXT and VALENCE (F(1,29) = 7.97, p = 0.008, ηp
2 
= 0.216). A P3a component was elicited for 
positive (M = 2.09 μV, SD = 2.84) but not negative feedback (M = 0.16 μV, SD = 2.45) in the relevant 
condition (t(29) = 3.62, p = 0.001). No such oddball-like effect was evidenced in the irrelevant condition 
(t(29) = 0.18, p = 0.859), with a negative and balanced amplitude for both feedback valences (M = -0.78 
μV, SD = 1.48 for negative feedback; M = -0.48 μV, SD = 1.96 for positive feedback).  
In Experiment 2, only the main effect of CONTEXT was significant (F(1,29) = 19.68, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.404), while the main effect of VALENCE (F(1,29) = 0.47, p = 0.5, ηp
2  
= 0.016), and the interaction 
effect between CONTEXT and VALENCE (F(1,29) = 2.47, p = 0.127, ηp
2 
= 0.078) were non-significant. 
The P3a amplitude was less negative for feedback (positive and negative pooled together) shown in the 
relevant (M = -0.62 μV, SD = 2.71) compared to the irrelevant context (M = -1.95 μV, SD = 2.02).  
3.4.3. P3b component 
In Experiment 1, at a later time following feedback onset (400-600 ms), a large P3b component was 
elicited at posterior parietal sites, especially for relevant compared to irrelevant feedback. This observation 
was confirmed by a significant main effect of CONTEXT (F(1,29) = 14.28, p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.432), while the 
main effect of VALENCE (F(1,29) = 0.24, p = 0.627, ηp
2 
= 0.013) and the CONTEXT x VALENCE 
interaction (F(1,29) = 0.32, p = 0.438, ηp
2 
= 0.017) were not significant. As it can be seen from Figure 4, this 
P3b component had a larger amplitude for feedback delivered in the relevant (M = 3.85 μV, SD = 2.79; M 
= 3.82 μV, SD = 2.81 for positive and negative feedback, respectively) compared to the irrelevant context 
(M = 2.55 μV, SD = 2.93; M = 2.88 μV, SD = 2.23 for positive and negative feedback, respectively), 
regardless of feedback valence (t(29) = 0.11, p = 0.876 and t(29) = -0.93, p = 0.572 for the relevant and 
irrelevant context, respectively).  
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Similarly to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 feedback shown in the relevant context led to a much 
larger P3b component compared with the irrelevant context, as captured by a significant main effect of 
CONTEXT (F(1,29) = 27.67, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.526). However, unlike what was found in Experiment 1, 
where this effect was valence-unspecific, here the valence of the feedback did influence the amplitude of 
the P3b component, in the relevant context selectively, as shown by a significant CONTEXT x 
VALENCE interaction effect (F(1,29) = 9.29, p = 0.009, ηp
2 
= 0.317). More specifically, in the relevant 
context, the P3b had a larger amplitude for negative (M = 4.28 μV, SD = 2.33) compared to positive 
feedback (M = 3.33 μV, SD = 2.27; t(29) = -2.28, p = 0.021), while no such clear amplitude difference 
depending on feedback valence was seen in the irrelevant context (M = 1.98 μV, SD = 1.75; M = 1.83 μV, 
SD = 1.16 for negative and positive feedback, respectively; t(29) = 1.11, p = 0.272). 
 [insert Figure 4 here] 
3.4.4. CRN component 
In Experiment 1, the amplitude difference at the CRN level between slow hits and fast hits was larger in 
the irrelevant than the relevant condition (see Figure 5). The ANOVA revealed a non-significant main 
effect of CONTEXT (F(1,29) = 0.14, p = 0.713, ηp
2 
= 0.005), a trend-significant main effect of RESPONSE 
(F(1,29) = 3.86, p = 0.059, ηp
2 
= 0.117), and importantly, a significant CONTEXT x RESPONSE interaction 
(F(1,29) = 4.66, p = 0.039, ηp
2 
= 0.138). Follow-up paired t-tests confirmed a larger CRN for slow (M = -
4.18 μV, SD = 3.62) than fast hits (M = -3.12 μV, SD = 3.56) in the irrelevant context only (t(29) = 2.56, p 
= 0.016), with no such early (response-locked) differentiation in the relevant context (with M = -4.04 μV, 
SD = 3.65, and M = -3.74 μV, SD = 3.67 for slow and fast responses, respectively; t(29) = 1.02, p = 0.317).  
In Experiment 2, the main effect of CONTEXT was found to be non-significant (F(1,29) = 0.04, p = 
0.836, ηp
2 
= 0.002), while the main effect of RESPONSE was highly significant (F(1,29) = 13.68, p = 0.001, 
ηp
2 
= 0.321). The CONTEXT x RESPONSE interaction was marginally significant (F(1,29) = 3.31, p = 
0.059, ηp
2 
= 0.102). Follow-up paired t-tests confirmed a larger CRN amplitude for slow (M = -3.58 μV, 
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SD = 3.62) than fast hits (M = -2.22 μV, SD = 3.53) in the irrelevant context (t(29) = 3.94, p < 0.001), while 
this effect was not significant in the relevant context (with M = -4.02 μV, SD = 3.61, and M = -3.75 μV, 
SD = 3.27 for slow and fast responses, respectively; t(29) = 1.93, p = 0.063). 
[insert Figure 5 here] 
4. Discussion 
In everyday-life situations PM provides a flexible and adaptive mechanism to detect the occurrence of 
mismatches or conflicts between goals or intentions and actions, and to trigger in turn remedial processes 
(Ullsperger et al., 2014b). Usually, this PM is achieved through the processing of specific internal (motor-
based) states or values, and/or the use of external (feedback-based) incentives or visual stimuli provided in 
the proximal environment. According to the first indicator hypothesis (Bediou, Koban, Rosset, Pourtois, & 
Sander, 2012; Gentsch, Ullsperger, & Ullsperger, 2009; Stahl, 2010) and the reward prediction error 
account (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), PM is a thrifty process in the sense that it uses the information available 
at a given moment in time (either response/motor- or feedback-based), thereby avoiding the need to 
perform multiple checks or monitoring across successive time epochs. When response/motor-based 
evidence lacks or has not accumulated properly, PM mainly operates based on the processing of external 
evaluative feedback (if available), usually provided in the form of a binary outcome (success/win or 
failure/loss). At the electrophysiological level, these two different stages of PM (internal and external) are 
captured by amplitude variations of the CRN/ERN and FRN components, respectively (Ullsperger et al., 
2014b). In this work, we mainly sought to test the prediction that PM is flexible and accordingly, it 
depends upon specific contextual or environmental factors. Central to this study was the prediction that 
goal relevance in the sense of feedback reliability can shape PM, with effects visible at the level of the 
FRN component, thereby challenging the assumption that this ERP component reflects the operation of a 
monitoring mechanism that is exclusively based on the valence or expectedness of the feedback stimuli 
(Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005). 
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To test this prediction, in two distinct ERP experiments, participants carried out a speeded 
Go/NoGo task with evaluative feedback informing them about the goal conduciveness of their actions 
(Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; 2012; Koban et al., 2012; Vocat et al., 2008). Critically, using a standard visual 
cueing technique and specific instructions, we manipulated the perceived goal relevance of the feedback 
by varying the objective goal relevance of the feedback across successive blocks, while keeping all other 
features of the task unchanged: In some blocks, the feedback was informative about actual task 
performance, while in the other blocks it was not, and therefore conveyed evaluative information that was 
unrelated to the actual performance. To make sure that participants attended to the feedback stimuli 
equally well in the two contexts (and hence to balance the overall task relevance of the feedback; see Folk 
& Remington, 2008), we added catch trials in which participants were occasionally asked to judge the 
emotional content of the face used as the feedback stimulus. Results for these catch trials (see Table 1) 
confirmed that participants attended to the feedback stimuli equally so in the two contexts. Moreover, 
manipulation checks confirmed that feedback was perceived as more relevant in the relevant than the 
irrelevant context. Critically, our new ERP results showed that this manipulation substantially influenced 
the amplitude of the FRN component. In Experiment 1, we found an amplitude difference between 
negative and positive feedback in the relevant context (Miltner et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004), but 
not in the irrelevant one. Moreover, the amplitude of this negative component was overall larger for 
feedback shown in the irrelevant than the relevant context. This latter result was replicated in Experiment 
2 where the probability of positive vs. negative feedback was balanced in the two contexts, confirming 
that reward expectancy does not solely account for amplitude variations at the level of the FRN 
component (but see Ferdinand et al., 2012). Moreover, following the FRN, we found a clear modulation of 
the parietal P3b with goal relevance, with this component being larger for relevant than irrelevant 
feedback. Interestingly, at the response level, we found a symmetrical outcome (compared to the P3b): 
Internal monitoring (and more specifically, the differentiation between fast/correct and slow/incorrect hits 
at the CRN level) was enhanced in the irrelevant context (where the external feedback provided was 
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deemed uninformative) compared to the relevant one. Below, we discuss the implications of these new 
ERP results in greater detail. 
4.1. Hierarchical PM effects at the FRN level 
Collectively, the new ERP results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the FRN component 
reflects the processing of goal relevance in the sense of the reliability (and/or the impact) of the feedback 
stimulus for goals. In both experiments the FRN amplitude differed between the irrelevant and the 
relevant condition, suggesting that this contextual manipulation did shape PM rapidly following feedback 
onset. Moreover, only in the relevant context there was a differential FRN effect reported between positive 
and negative feedback, when the former was infrequent compared to the latter (Experiment 1). This 
valence-specific effect is compatible with the dominant reward prediction error account (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Proudfit, 2015) emphasizing the combined role of valence and expectedness during PM, as 
well as more recent ERP results emphasizing the importance of expectedness at the root of the FRN 
(Ferdinand et al., 2012). However, our new ERP findings significantly extend these earlier models and 
results by suggesting a possible hierarchy among different PM processes operating rapidly following 
feedback onset (at the FRN level). More specifically, goal relevance appears to be a pre-requisite for 
effects of valence and/or expectedness at the FRN level. Furthermore, expectedness effects seemed to be a 
pre-requisite for valence effects. Indeed, when the expectedness of the feedback was carefully balanced 
(in Experiment 2), the FRN valence effect was strongly attenuated (relative to Experiment 1 in which 
positive feedback stimuli were less frequent than negative feedback stimuli, and a clear valence effect was 
found at the FRN level in the relevant context only), and it was apparently delayed to the P3b component 
(see below). This suggests that amplitude variations of the FRN component might depend upon different 
(monitoring) processes operating concurrently, which differ from one another regarding their actual level 
of abstractness within a putative hierarchy of medial frontal (or lateral frontal) brain structures timely 
engaged during PM and, more generally, cognitive control (see Badre, 2008 for a plausible neuro-
anatomical model based on fMRI and patient data, suggesting a rostro-caudal organization or gradient in 
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lateral prefrontal cortex). With this scenario, goal relevance would provide a superordinate level of 
processing during PM, with expectedness occupying an intermediate level, and valence perhaps a 
subordinate level. Given the limited spatial resolution of ERPs, it appears difficult to corroborate this 
assumption directly, however, and future (multimodal) studies are needed to assess whether amplitude 
variations at the FRN level during PM might be explained by multiple sources arising from the prefrontal 
cortex and obeying a rostro-caudal anatomical organization. 
The lack of a differential FRN (valence) effect when positive and negative feedback were 
carefully balanced in the relevant condition (Experiment 2) is actually in agreement with many previous 
ERP studies (see Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ferdinand et al., 2012), which already suggested that reward 
probability is an important variable modulating the amplitude of the FRN component (i.e., reward 
prediction error account; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). In addition, our new ERP results align with a recent 
theoretical model (see Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014a) assuming that PM is not a fixed or rigid 
process, but that dynamic changes or adjustments in this process can be observed: If (reward) probability 
is no longer informative (see Experiment 2, relevant context), then feedback processing appears to be 
postponed to later stages (i.e., the P3b component, see below). 
In the case of a strong imbalance between positive and negative feedback (in the relevant context 
of Experiment 1), not only the amplitude of the FRN component (250-300 ms post-feedback onset), but 
also the subsequent frontal P3a (350-450 ms post-feedback onset) was reliably influenced by this 
valence/expectedness effect (being larger for positive/infrequent than negative/frequent feedback). This 
confirmed the sensitivity of this later ERP component to the detection of positive, salient and infrequent or 
unexpected stimuli (Polich, 2007). No such P3a effect was evidenced when the two feedback types were 
equiprobable (in the irrelevant contexts and the relevant context of Experiment 2). However, in this case, 
the main effect of goal relevance was still significant during the FRN time course, suggesting that the P3a 
and FRN reflect different stages of feedback/stimulus processing during PM (see also von Borries et al., 
2013). Our auxiliary ERP topographical mapping analysis also confirmed that these two successive ERP 
components could be dissociated from one another (see Methods section).  
25 
 
It must be noted that previous psychophysiological research already provided hints about the 
importance of goal relevance of the feedback to explain amplitude modulations of well-known feedback-
locked ERP components (such as the FRN and P3/LPC) during PM (see also Gibbons et al., 2016; 
Osinsky, Walter, & Hewig, 2014). For example, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) previously reported a 
larger FRN to negative outcomes during a probabilistic reinforcement learning task when compared with 
favorable ones, but exclusively in a condition/context in which participants had chosen to attend to the 
feedback. In this earlier study, no such FRN (valence) effect was reported in a condition in which 
participants had chosen to avoid it. Moreover, these authors also reported a larger P3b component for 
unfavorable compared to favorable feedback, but this effect was equally strong in the chosen and avoided 
contexts. It must be noted, however, that the procedure devised by Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) is not 
entirely comparable with the context manipulation used in our study. The main difference is that feedback 
information provided in the irrelevant context of our study was completely uninformative, while feedback 
in the avoided condition of Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) was informative to some degree, as participants 
probably still could decipher what they could have won or lost if they had actually chosen to receive it 
(instead of avoiding it). As feedback was informative (goal-relevant) to some degree in both conditions in 
their study, this can therefore potentially explain why the P3b component was not statistically different 
between their avoided vs. chosen condition. Moreover, an asset of our experimental design was that, 
unlike Fischer and Ullsperger (2013), task relevance (and hence attention allocated to the feedback) was 
balanced between the two contexts. In another ERP study using a gambling task, Gentsch and colleagues 
(2013) provided evidence for sequential appraisal effects taking place at the level of the FRN and P300 
components, with the former ERP deflection being related to the appraisal of goal conduciveness and the 
latter component to the appraisal of coping potential. Finally, Holroyd, Krigolson, Baker, Lee, and Gibson 
(2009) already elegantly demonstrated the sensitivity of the FRN amplitude to reward probability during 
PM depending on the specific (reinforcement learning) context (or trial history) used, and speculatively 
depending on its relevance. Their results showed that the FRN amplitude tracked reward probability, 
particularly in tasks where an optimal response could be learned from previous trial encounters, in contrast 
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to tasks where no such learning could take place. Although Holroyd et al. (2009) did not interpret their 
ERP findings in terms of goal relevance either, one could nonetheless assume that this factor (i.e., the 
amount of information provided or conveyed by the feedback concerning the actual goal conduciveness of 
actions) could explain these results obtained for the FRN. However, an important difference between this 
earlier ERP study (or the study of Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013) and ours pertains to the lack of any 
learning (or reinforcement learning) component in our study, in which a simple speeded Go/NoGo task 
was used throughout all blocks. Accordingly, our new ERP results align with those of Holroyd et al. 
(2009) and Fischer and Ullsperger (2013), but they also extend them significantly by showing that effects 
of goal relevance on the FRN component during PM could be evidenced in experimental contexts devoid 
of learning. 
In the two experiments alike, the FRN amplitude reliably differed between the two contexts, being 
larger (i.e., more negative) in response to irrelevant than to relevant feedback. This could tentatively be 
explained by the fact that on average in half of the trials in the irrelevant context participants received 
feedback information that actually mismatched with the outcome of the preceding internal monitoring 
process. This type of mismatch may have led to the augmentation of the FRN component, which is known 
to be sensitive to prediction error. Additional ERP studies are needed, however, to confirm this 
interpretation. 
Lastly, even though feedback processing was modulated in amplitude 250-300 ms post-feedback 
onset at fronto-central sites as a function of goal relevance, and this effect therefore overlapped (in space 
and time) with the time-course of the FRN, this does not imply that it necessarily reflected a canonical 
FRN component, or a modulation of this PM component exclusively. The use of multiple and different 
facial expressions as feedback stimuli on task performance in our experiments (as opposed to simpler, 
binary symbolic feedback stimuli, as used repeatedly in previous ERP studies), might potentially explain 
the specific topography and morphology of the FRN effect reported in this study.  
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4.2. Motivational salience or updating of feedback information reflected in the amplitude of the P3b 
component 
Another important contribution of our ERP study is to show systematic amplitude variations of the 
subsequent parietal P3b as a function of goal relevance, albeit of a different nature than the preceding 
FRN (and P3a). Across the two experiments, the P3b was substantially larger for relevant than irrelevant 
feedback. Consistent with previous ERP findings (see von Borries et al., 2013), this long-latency effect 
could reflect an enhanced attention allocation to significant or salient (emotional) information available in 
the environment, or even the updating of relevant stimulus information (Donchin & Coles, 1998; Polich, 
2007). Previous ERP studies already confirmed the link between the amplitude of the P3b component and 
the processing of stimuli meant to update or alter existing/prior knowledge or information about them 
(Hajcak et al., 2006; 2007). Translated to our new ERP results, external feedback on task performance 
provided in the relevant context triggered an updating or enhanced (motivational) processing, relative to 
the same feedback provided in the irrelevant context and lacking thereby motivational significance. 
Noteworthy, this P3b amplitude effect (or the preceding FRN or P3a effects) cannot be explained by 
asymmetrical or uncontrolled attentional or task relevance effects between the two contexts since in both 
cases the feedback was always task-relevant (as ensured by the use of specific catch trials). Additionally, 
in Experiment 2, we found that negative feedback provided in the relevant context led to a larger P3b 
component than positive feedback provided in the same context, suggesting some flexibility in the amount 
of stimulus updating achieved in this condition. Presumably, negative feedback conveying a punishment-
related meaning (or informing about self-efficacy failure) had a larger impact on stimulus updating than 
positive feedback in the relevant context in this experiment (see also Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013). 
Relatedly, at the behavioral level, we also found that participants judged the feedback to be more reliable 
in the relevant condition in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1. Alternatively, it is also conceivable that in 
Experiment 2, in which feedback expectancy was controlled for, valence-based PM did not operate at the 
FRN level, but was postponed to the P3b. Importantly, however, in Experiment 2, goal relevance did 
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modulate the amplitude of the FRN component. As such, our ERP results emphasize the flexibility of 
these PM brain processes (based on external feedback processing), and they contradict earlier theoretical 
accounts that posit context-independent monitoring of either valence or expectedness (or both) at the FRN 
or P3 level (Hajcak et al., 2005; 2006). Our new ERP results clearly suggest that when feedback 
expectancy could not be used by the participants to assign ‘online’ a different value to either positive or 
negative feedback on task performance (Experiment 2), then the (normal) valence effect at the FRN level 
occurred later in time following feedback onset, namely at the P3b level. Importantly, our new findings 
show for the first time the strong dependence of these flexible neurophysiological effects reflecting PM to 
goal relevance, conceived here as feedback reliability. 
4.3. Flexible external and internal PM effects 
According to dominant models (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ullsperger et al., 2014a), PM is a fairly dynamic 
and flexible process. It seeks to minimize redundancy and utilises the information available at a given 
moment in time (either response- or feedback-based) to guide behavior. This enables rapid adjustments 
and an efficient updating of actions’ value depending on the availability of contextual cues or incentives 
available in the environment. To verify this assumption, we tested whether our manipulation of goal 
relevance, by means of contextual cues and written instructions, also influenced response-locked ERPs (in 
addition to the feedback-locked ERP data discussed above), with a focus on the CRN component (Coles, 
Scheffers, & Holroyd, 2001; Roger, Bénar, Vidal, Hasbroucq, & Burle, 2010). In line with our 
hypotheses, we found in the two experiments alike that in the irrelevant context (where the feedback 
provided on task performance was deemed uninformative) internal monitoring was transiently enhanced, 
as expressed by a larger CRN differentiation between slow/incorrect and fast/correct hits in this context 
compared to the relevant one. These complementing results are important because they lend support to the 
notion of flexible and adaptive PM effects in humans (Ullsperger et al., 2014a), with an apparent shift of 
the monitoring process (from external to internal cues) when externally provided feedback on task 
performance is no longer reliable (i.e., in the irrelevant context). Notably, the observation that goal 
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relevance can shape not only the way evaluative feedback (external cues), but also motor responses 
(internal cues) are timely processed during PM is another important contribution of our study. 
4.4. Conclusions 
The present study shows that PM brain processes (captured by the FRN, P3, and CRN components) are 
flexible and reliably shaped by contextual effects related to goal relevance. In the present case, we 
operationalized goal relevance as the reliability of specific incentives (i.e., evaluative feedback) informing 
participants about the goal conduciveness of their actions, and we made it variable across successive 
blocks using a within-subjects design while controlling for all other task dimensions. When participants 
were cued that feedback provided on task performance was disconnected from their behavior/decision, the 
FRN component no longer distinguished rewards from punishments (Experiment 1), as if the normal PM 
processes were inactive or transiently suppressed. This suggests that goal relevance influences early stages 
of PM based on feedback. Importantly, in this condition (irrelevant context), an enhanced internal 
monitoring (at the CRN level) was found. Moreover, our results confirm that feedback expectancy is an 
important variable accounting for amplitude modulations occurring at the FRN level during PM. When 
reward and punishment probability were matched (as in the relevant context of Experiment 2), the 
processing of these two opposite outcomes was delayed and took place at the P3b level. As such, these 
new findings largely accord with dominant PM models in the literature (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Proudfit, 
2015; Ullsperger et al., 2014a), while they also open new avenues for a better conceptualization and 
integration of goal relevance into these models. 
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Table 1. Behavioral results. Mean number (or percentage) and speed (with the corresponding standard 
error of the mean in parenthesis) provided separately for the different conditions and the two experiments. 
Note that average numbers of Go trials (Fast hits/Slow hits) and feedback (Positive following Fast hits, 
Negative following Slow hits in the relevant context, and Positive/Negative randomly following Fast/Slow 
hits in the irrelevant context) are presented in a bold font, and are followed by the corresponding range 
(minimal-maximal number of trials). At the electrophysiological level, only these trials were analyzed. 
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Figure 1. Experimental procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2 (here illustrated for Go trials, followed by 
hits). (A) At response onset (speeded Go/NoGo decision; see Methods), a specific colored frame appeared 
around the target, signaling the response-feedback relation (relevant context), or (B) another color 
appeared in different blocks to signal the lack thereof (irrelevant context). This association between the 
color of the frame and goal relevance was alternated across participants. The frame stayed on screen until 
feedback offset. In the relevant context, fast hits were always followed by a positive feedback, while slow 
hits were always followed by a negative feedback. In contrast, in the irrelevant context, an equal amount 
of positive and negative feedback was presented randomly regardless of the accuracy and speed of the 
preceding action. 
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Figure 2. (A) Feedback-locked grand average ERP waveforms (Fz and FCz collapsed) for Experiment 1. 
The FRN (250-300 ms post-feedback onset) and the subsequent P3a (350-450 ms) had differential 
amplitudes for positive and negative feedback, in the relevant context only. The corresponding 
topographical scalp maps (horizontal view) are presented for (B) the FRN and (C) the P3a. 
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Figure 3. (A) Feedback-locked grand average ERP waveforms (Fz and FCz collapsed) for Experiment 2. 
The FRN (250-300 ms post-feedback onset) and the subsequent P3a (350-450 ms) had differential 
amplitudes for relevant than irrelevant feedback. The corresponding topographical scalp maps (horizontal 
view) are presented for (B) the FRN and (C) the P3a. 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Figure 4. (A) Feedback-locked grand average ERP waveforms (CPz, Pz, P1, and P2 collapsed) for 
Experiment 1. The P3b component (400-600 ms post-feedback onset) was larger for relevant than 
irrelevant feedback. (B) The corresponding topographical scalp maps (horizontal view) are presented. (C) 
Feedback-locked grand average ERP waveforms (CPz, Pz, P1, and P2 collapsed) for Experiment 2. The 
P3b component (400-600 ms post-feedback onset) was larger for relevant than irrelevant feedback. 
Moreover, in the relevant context only, the P3b has a larger amplitude for negative than positive feedback. 
(D) The corresponding topographical scalp maps (horizontal view) are presented. 
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Figure 5. (A) Response-locked grand average ERP waveforms (Fz and FCz collapsed) for Experiment 1. 
The CRN component (-10/+30 ms around response onset) was larger for slow hits than fast hits, in the 
irrelevant context only. (B) The corresponding topographical scalp maps (horizontal view) are presented. 
(C) Response-locked grand average ERP waveforms (Fz and FCz collapsed) for Experiment 2. The CRN 
component (-10/+30 ms around response onset) was larger for slow hits than fast hits, in the irrelevant 
context only. (D) The corresponding topographical scalp maps (horizontal view) are presented. 
